between Wiggins’s own work and Tarski’s famous Convention T and Moore
concentrating on Wiggins’s notion of a vindicatory explanation. Edward
Hussey and Cheryl Misak discuss the latter task, with Hussey concentrating
on Plato and Protagoras and Misak concentrating on issues relating to
pragmatism, holism and empiricism.
The quality of the papers in this volume is generally good, and in his
Replies Wiggins is honest, open-minded, and more than willing to restate,
refashion, and develop further his views on the various topics which the
contributors discuss. Philosophers interested in Wiggins’s views on these topics
will find the Replies interesting and enlightening. There is also some (perhaps
unintentional?) humour. Witness paragraph §48 from the Replies:
There is something disturbing in the fact that over several years McDowell
and I were in a position to talk to one another about whatever we liked
on almost any day of the week, yet I still misunderstood him. (p. 258).
What hope is there for the rest of us?
THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
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METAPHYSICS
Self and World
By QUASSIM CASSAM
Oxford University Press, 1997. viii 1 208 pp. £30.00
Self and World is an attempt to provide and assess arguments for materialism
about self-consciousness. This is not an ontological thesis, rather it is the
claim that in some sense ‘‘self-consciousness requires awareness of oneself qua
subject as shaped, located and solid’’ (p. 117). Importantly, the qualifying
‘some sense’ leaves room for unpacking in terms of a conception of oneself as
a physical object or merely an intuitive awareness of oneself as such. Taking
note of this crucial distinction, which he uses to good effect, Cassam’s book
makes a sober, sustained case for this thesis by relying on three complementary
arguments which strike from several directions at once. Following in the
footsteps of Kant and Strawson, these arguments, which comprise the three
central chapters of the book, are all transcendental in form.
First, the Objectivity Argument claims that in order to be self-conscious a
subject must be able to think of its experiences as including perceptions of
objects in the weighty sense (of existing unperceived). Thus, the argument is
designed to show that to be in such a position it is necessary that the subject
is aware of itself, qua subject of experience, as a physical object in the sense
of being shaped, located and solid.
Second, the Unity Argument claims that in order to be self-conscious a
subject must be capable of self-ascribing different experiences at different
times. This requires unitary awareness of that to which the experiences are
ascribed. And it is claimed that a necessary condition on the possibility of
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such awareness is that the subject has a capacity for experience of objects in
the weighty sense. This requires being able to draw a distinction between
‘how things appear’ and ‘how things are’, which in turn, Cassam argues,
requires the capacity to distinguish ‘how things appear to me’.
Finally, the Identity Argument sets out to establish that awareness of oneself
as a physical object is a necessary condition of being aware of one’s own
identity as the subject of different experiences. In order to be self-conscious
a subject must, in some sense, conceive of itself as a spatio-temporally located
continuant—a locus for the ascription of thought contents and experiences.
This, allegedly, requires awareness of oneself as belonging to the category:
physical object.
The subtle differences in the arguments of this triad is largely based on
their direction of flow and the kind of support they lend to one another. As
Cassam notes, the Identity Argument is meant to generate the initial premise
of the Objectivity argument as a conclusion. Hence, it lends explanatory
support to the first argument. Likewise, the Unity Argument raises questions
about the conditions required for self-ascription which the Identity Argument
is meant to supply. It is by firing several arrows at once that Cassam hopes
to bring down his prey. Even philosophers who are generally suspicious of
transcendental arguments will find him a sensitive sparring partner. His
tendency is to err on the side of caution and his treatment is, on the whole,
extremely fair.
Nevertheless, I would like to raise a concern about the overall success
of his project. Cassam’s primary targets are Kantian, or Wittgensteinian,
philosophers who claim that selves are purely formal or logical and Cartesians
who regard them as non-physical but substantial. The line he advances
against the formalists is that self-referring thoughts must be located or
anchored in the world by some means. His line against the Cartesians is that
in order to sensibly ascribe thoughts and experiences we need to know what
kind of thing to which they can be sensibly ascribed. Since thoughts and
experiences must be located, and cannot be ascribed to a mere body, we
must suppose that they are ascribed to a person and not an immaterial
substance. By this reasoning we are driven towards the conclusion that
persons must fall under the category of ‘physical object’. But, even accepting
the force of Cassam’s arguments, there is room to accept that persons form
a basic, irreducible ontological category distinct from that of physical objects
but which nevertheless have the feature of being spatio-temporal continuants.
On such a view it would be a necessary condition for self-consciousness that
we are aware of ourselves as spatio-temporal continuants but not thereby
physical objects per se. This is an important option given Cassam’s own
reasons for scepticism about reductionism and in light of normative issues
concerning the ascription (and self-ascription of thoughts) which would make
persons peculiarly unique amongst the class of physical objects (if in that class
at all).
On a final, more general, note, my view is that while transcendental
arguments are both philosophically instructive and necessary they can only
take us so far. For example, some of the issues raised in the book concerning
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the plausibility of certain idealist or materialist conceptions of the self take us
away from the security of transcendental arguments and into the messy realm
of speculation and theorising. Cassam’s admirable concern for rigour causes
him to shy away from such speculation. Perhaps he recognises that it is here
that monsters lie. But attempting to slay such monsters is a vital part of the
philosophical enterprise. With respect to self-consciousness Cassam’s book
both prepares us for this adventure and gives us good incentive to take it on.
THE UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE
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Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of ‘New Logic’
By STEPHEN H. PHILLIPS
Open Court, 1995. xii 1 391 pp.
Interest in classical Indian philosophy is still an esoteric pursuit among
analytical philosophers, and Indian philosophy is commonly dismissed as
more theology than philosophy, or at most having about as much philosophical
use as Hegelian idealism. It is understandable why this should be. Apart from
the quite brilliant work of authorities like the late lamented Bimal Matilal
(see, for example, his Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge
(Oxford University Press, 1986)), a friend at Oxford of Dummett and
Strawson, presentations of Indian philosophy have tended to concentrate on
aspects of their field which, for various historical reasons, Indian scholars
with a Western-style education themselves have tended to admire, precisely
those forms associated directly with a spiritual path and very often with some
superficial similarity to Western idealism. As idealism became less popular in
Western philosophical circles under the influence of, inter alia Frege, Russell
and Wittgenstein so any interest in Indian philosophy faded among the
mainstream tradition at least in Anglo-American philosophy.
And yet it cannot be stressed enough how unreasonable and one-sided this
vision of Indian philosophy is. On the one hand, in recent years philosophers
with a training in analytic philosophy have returned with renewed interest
to Hegelian and other forms of Western idealism, and also the application of
the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy in the philosophy of religion
has reached new heights of sophistication and interest. On the other hand in
studying the history of philosophy particularly important in recent years has
been the study of classical and mediaeval philosophy by those with a training
in analytic philosophy as well as the relevant linguistic abilities. This
broadening of interest by analytic philosophers—and perhaps greater
humility—has been of immense importance in the development of contemporary philosophy. For many years Aristotle was dismissed except by a
small number of neo-scholastics, yet the influence of Aristotle on the
contemporary discussion of, for instance, substance, or virtue ethics, is obvious
and well-known. Similarly Hellenistic philosophy, and particularly mediaeval
philosophy, have been seen as eras of philosophical nit-picking, decadence,
or—perhaps worst of all—merely spiritual or religious interest, and yet now
careful textual study by those with a training in analytic philosophy is
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revealing the great depths and real philosophical contribution they have to
offer. Inasmuch as there is often a tendency for philosophical problems to
arise out of or mirror grammatical categories, it should be obvious that the
interest to be found in Greek and Latin philosophy may also be found in
philosophy preserved in Sanskrit, the other great classical Indo-European
language and the language of most classical Indian philosophy. And it should
be made clear once and for all: Philosophical discussion in India over three
and a half millennia is by no means all about religion, salvation, or
idealism. There are here extensive discussions of all the topics which interest
contemporary analytic philosophers, from abstract entities, and action, to
validity, and verification, and bags of interesting material on truth, perception,
induction, and particularly language and meaning. And the idealists by no
means had it all their own way in India. The school of thought known as
Nyāya, whose very name is often translated as ‘Epistemologists’, or ‘Logicians’
par excellence, was a school of critical realists of enormous influence who carried
out a prolonged debate with nominalists and idealists, and anyone who might
be tempted to nominalism or idealism, for over two thousand years. Since
about the fourteenth century the intricate and enormously refined system of
realism known as ‘Navya-Nyāya’, the ‘New-Nyāya’, has carried on this debate—
and it still exists in India today. Not to mention the ancient tradition of
‘Cārvāka’, India’s very own materialists, or sometimes sceptics, and perhaps
verificationists.
Part of the problem, however, for students wishing to incorporate Indian
materials into their philosophical contemplations, is knowing where to start.
It is not at all easy at the moment to find an introductory book written by
someone with sufficient grasp of Sanskrit, mastery of the cultural context,
and knowledge of contemporary philosophy. Stephen H. Phillips’s book aims
to help fill that gap, and in this he is largely successful. This book is not an
overview of Indian philosophy, nor is it even an overview of Indian
metaphysics. In an approach with which I have great sympathy Phillips has
chosen to introduce his subject by concentrating on the detailed study of
some uniformly-translated passages from a few texts illustrating a particular
stage in the debate between a major school of idealists known as Advaita
Vedānta, and the defence of reasoning over an arational spiritual intuition,
and realism (both in terms of universals and ‘common sense’) over idealism,
in the Navya-Nyāya. In particular, Phillips has concentrated on a detailed
critical attack on the very foundations of rationality and thus certainly any
form of realism, by the idealist absolutist Śrı̄harsa (c.1150 CE), and the
defence of both by followers of Navya-Nyāya such as Gaṅgeśa (early fourteenth
century). In so doing many interesting philosophical topics are treated, such
as truth and the justification of putative true judgements, the relationship of
concept-forming to perception, the problem of universals, the status of an
absence and the nature of negation, and issues relating to identity and
difference. Thus the student approaches Indian philosophy through immersion
directly in disputes and texts, by far the best way to get a feel for the subject.
Phillips offers his own translations, in small pieces, with a careful explanation
after each translation. Much of the material translated is difficult and
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sophisticated, and has either not been translated before or is newly translated.
Phillips also includes a romanised version of the Sanskrit text, so his translations
can be checked against the original. They read well, and represent an
important contribution to trying to express these texts written in a very
technical form of highly-inflected philosophical Sanskrit in the rather different
structures of philosophical English. Thus this book also has much to interest
the specialist, as well as one new to Indian philosophy, and it is very much
a book which could be used with profit by a university instructor keen to
introduce the subject either to Indologists or, particularly, into a philosophy
course. But Phillips does not simply throw the student in at the deep end. In
earlier chapters he fills in the religious, philosophical and cultural background
to Indian idealism and mysticism on the one hand, and the growth of a
tradition of critical realism on the other. It is here that the book is perhaps
at its weakest. Perhaps understandably, the more remote the material from
Phillips’s main interests the less reliable it becomes. He readily admits that
he is no specialist on Buddhism (p. 330) and his portrayal of Buddhism on
pp. 13–14, particularly on nirvāna, is very misleading. Likewise his short
˙
discussion of the early Buddhist Nāgārjuna
(c. second century CE) tramples
on issues which are hotly-debated among Nāgārjuna scholars. But it would
be unfair to criticise Phillips for not being a specialist on every aspect of
Indian philosophy. His introductory discussion of Nyāya metaphysics (pp. 37
ff.) appears excellent, and could serve as handy introduction to Nyāya for
those looking for one, with some useful diagrams. Let this, and material from
elsewhere, be used by instructors in their introductions. The real value of the
book nevertheless lies in its detailed discussion of topics in the debate between
Śrı̄harsa and the Navya-Nyāya. And for that, and any boost it can give to
˙ of Indian philosophy among analytically-trained philosophers, the
the study
book is very welcome.
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL
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Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of
Knowledge
Edited by JONATHAN L. KVANIG
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996. x 1 385 pp. $62.50 cloth,
$23.95 paper
In the early 1990s, Plantinga’s Warrant: The Current Debate (WCD for short)
surveyed current accounts of knowledge, and his companion volume Warrant
and Proper Function (WPF ) added his own theory to this debate. This theory
first offered a functional definition of ‘warrant’ as whatever it is which
distinguishes true belief from knowledge, and then added a substantive
characterisation of what fills this functional role. The essentials were that a
belief has warrant for you if and only if (1) the belief is produced by properly
functioning cognitive faculties, which (2) are operating in an environment
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